Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
| dc.contributor.author | Alcalde Unzu, Jorge | |
| dc.contributor.author | Gallo, Oihane | |
| dc.contributor.author | Vorsatz, Marc | |
| dc.contributor.department | Economía | es_ES |
| dc.contributor.department | Ekonomia | eu |
| dc.contributor.department | Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-16T15:53:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-16T15:53:23Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-07-01 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2024-10-16T15:28:23Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency. | en |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project PID2021-127119NB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by "ERDF A way of making Europe"); Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through project 100018_192583, and additional support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects PID2021-127119NB-I00 and PID2019-107539GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”). | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | Alcalde-Unzu, J., Gallo, O., Vorsatz, M. (2024) Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 147, 107-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/52302 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior 147, 2024, 107-127 | |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2021-2023/PID2021-127119NB-I00/ES/ | |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-107539GB-I00/ES/ | |
| dc.relation.publisherversion | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011 | |
| dc.rights | © 2024 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the CC BY license. | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Single-dipped preferences | en |
| dc.subject | Single-peaked preferences | en |
| dc.subject | Social choice rule | en |
| dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | en |
| dc.title | Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences | en |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 7db026f4-4346-47c8-a01d-4218e3d23bb4 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 7db026f4-4346-47c8-a01d-4218e3d23bb4 |